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What are the effects of deliberation about political issues? This essay reports the results 
of a kind of Deliberation Day, involving sixty-three citizens in Colorado. Groups from Boulder, 
a predominantly liberal city, met and discussed global warming, affirmative action, and civil 
unions for same-sex couples; groups from Colorado Springs, a predominately conservative city, 
met to discuss the same issues. The major effect of deliberation was to make group members 
more extreme than they were when they started to talk. Liberals became more liberal on all three 
issues; conservatives became more conservative. As a result, the division between the citizens of 
Boulder and the citizens of Colorado Springs were significantly increased as a result of 
intragroup deliberation. Deliberation also increased consensus, and dampened diversity, within 
the groups. Hence Deliberation Day produced group polarization, in the distinctive form of 
ideological amplification. Implications are explored for the uses and structure of deliberation in 
general. 
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What Happened on Deliberation Day? 
 
David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein, and Reid Hastie 
 
1. Introduction 
The American constitutional system aspires to be a deliberative democracy – one that 
combines accountability with a high degree of reflection and reason-giving.
1 Inspired by the 
deliberative ideal, many people have explored the foundations of political deliberation and its 
implications for political reform.2 Indeed, Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin have gone so far 
as to suggest a new national holiday, Deliberation Day, on which citizens would deliberate about 
national issues, in a manner intended to promote political learning and more reasonable 
judgments.
3  Many days, especially but not only during campaigns, are the functional equivalent 
of Deliberation Days, at least for some people some of the time. But what is likely to happen on 
Deliberation Day?   
For a Deliberation Day to realize its promise, a reasonable variety of views must be 
expressed and discussed.  Without exposure to competing views, citizens will not be able to 
engage in a balanced and informed weighing of positions – a prerequisite of deliberation.  But 
sufficient diversity may be unlikely if people engage in voluntary self-sorting, or if citizens are 
sorted in geographical terms, where sheer demographics may well mean that most groups consist 
largely of like-minded people.
4 In fact there is evidence that in the United States, different 
communities are becoming more homogeneous in ideological terms.
5 To the extent that this is so, 
groups may well fail to have the requisite diversity on Deliberation Day. And even if 
considerable diversity exists, it remains possible to question the likely effects of deliberation. 
Perhaps error rather than truth, or confusion rather than clarity, will ultimately prevail. 
 
                                            
1 See JOSEPH BESSETTE, THE MILD VOICE OF REASON (1994); ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE 
DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN CITIZENS LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? (1998). 
2 See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS (1996) (elaborating deliberative conception of democracy); 
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (Jon Elster ed., 1998) (collecting diverse treatments of deliberative democracy); AMY 
GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996) (defending deliberative democracy and 
discussing its preconditions).  
3 See BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY (2004). 
4 See Diana Mutz, Hearing the Other Side 46-48 (2006) 
5See id;Bill Bishop, The Great Divide (2004), available at <http://www.statesman.com/metrostate/content/special 
reports/greatdivide/index.html>(showing increased uniformity within communities, defined in geographical terms). 2 
   
To examine those effects, we created an experimental Deliberation Day. On this day, 
citizens from two cities in Colorado were assembled into five-person groups and asked to 
deliberate on three of the most contested issues of the time:  global warming, affirmative action, 
and civil unions for same-sex couples. The two cities were Boulder, known to be predominantly 
liberal, and Colorado Springs, known to be predominantly conservative. Citizens were asked to 
record their views individually and anonymously; to deliberate together and to reach, if possible, 
a group decision; and then to record their post-deliberation views individually and anonymously.  
What happened on Deliberation Day?  The basic answers are simple. First, the groups 
from Boulder became even more liberal on all three issues; the groups from Colorado Springs 
became even more conservative. Deliberation thus increased extremism. Second, every group 
showed increased consensus, and decreased diversity, in the attitudes of their members.  Many of 
the groups showed substantial heterogeneity before they started to deliberate; as a result of a 
brief period of discussion, group members showed much more agreement, even in the 
anonymous expressions of their private views. Third, deliberation sharply increased the 
differences between the views of the largely liberal citizens of Boulder and the largely 
conservative citizens of Colorado Springs.  Before deliberation began, there was considerable 
overlap between many individuals in the two different cities.  After deliberation, the overlap was 
much smaller.  
The simplest statement of our findings is that deliberation among like-minded people 
produced ideological amplification – an amplification of preexisting ideological tendencies, in 
which group discussion leads to greater extremism. If our experimental findings generalize to the 
real world, deliberation will lead groups of like-minded people to show increased extremism, 
decreased internal diversity, and greater divisions across ideological lines. These effects should 
be expected to occur when groups self-sort in purely geographical terms; they should also occur 
when the sorting occurs in terms of what people read and watch.
6  
                                            
6 See Shanto Iyengar and Richard Morin, Red Media, Blue Media, Washington Post (May 3, 2006), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/03/AR2006050300865.html. Iyengar and Morin 
conducted an experiment in which people were permitted to choose to read accounts, on the same subject, from Fox 
News, National Public Radio, the British Broadcasting Company, and CNN. They found a great deal of self-sorting. 
Republicans consistently favored Fox News, especially on politically charged topics, whereas Democrats divided 
their choices between CNN and NPR. Independents showed no preference. The authors conclude: “The importance 
of source labels to news consumption will only grow as technology diffuses and consumers increasingly customize 
their online news menus. As this trend progresses, there is the real possibility that news will no longer serve as a 
"social glue" that connects all Americans; instead, the very same lines that divide voters will also divide news 
audiences.” 3 
   
Ideological amplification of various kinds has been established in other experimental 
settings, as we shall see; but to date, the phenomenon has been little explored in the context of 
contested political issues. As we shall also see, our experimental design diverges dramatically 
from that in related experiments.
7 In key ways, our design corresponds more closely to the real 
world of social deliberation, both formal and informal. 
In this essay, we report the results of our Deliberation Day experiment, attempt to explain 
those results, and offer some brief remarks on the implications for law and democracy in general. 
We suggest that the Colorado experiment has analogies in many domains of democratic life. It 
offers a vivid warning about the consequences of any kind of sorting along political lines, raises 
fresh doubts about the uncritical celebration of political deliberation, and suggests the need for 
careful institutional design of well-functioning democratic processes. Let us begin with the 
details of the study. 
 
2. Deliberation Day in Colorado  
A. Procedures 
Sixty-three voting-eligible adults between the ages of 20 and 75 participated; thirty-four 
were women and twenty-nine were men.  Participants were recruited from two counties in 
Colorado for a study on opinions about social and political issues by a professional survey 
research firm using random digit dialing. They received $100 for a two-hour session.  The 
Colorado location was selected purely for logistical convenience.  A similar recruitment protocol 
could have been followed in any state or geographical area. 
Half of the sample was drawn from Boulder County, which voted 67% for Democratic 
candidate John Kerry in the 2004 presidential election, and the other half from El Paso County 
(Colorado Springs), which voted 67% for Republican candidate George Bush.  Participants were 
also screened to have generally liberal (Boulder) or conservative (Colorado Springs) political 
views.
8   There were a total of five conservative groups and five liberal groups, with five to seven 
                                            
7 See the treatment of James Fishkin’s studies, below. 
8 Screening questions included the following. (a) “In general, would you describe your political views as very 
conservative, conservative, moderate, liberal, or very liberal?” (b) “Suppose you were in the voting booth and you 
came across an office for which two candidates . . . were running and you had never heard of either one.  Which 
candidate would you choose-- the Democrat or the Republican--or would you just not vote for that office?” Grades 
were also assigned to various people on how they would be as president.  The conservative names included Dick 4 
   
members each.  In each county, participants came to a central location at a local university for 
the study.  In the first session, each person completed an individual questionnaire about his or her 
personal views on several topics; participants engaged in this task before being informed that 
they would be part of a group discussion.  
After all participants had completed their individual questionnaires, they were moved to a 
different room and told that they would discuss some of the issues as a group. The following 
instructions were read aloud by a study administrator: 
 
“Next you will meet as a group to discuss some of the topics you just 
considered in the survey.  As a group, your job will be to try to reach a 
consensus among you about each topic. As an individual, your job is to 
express your personal opinion on each discussion topic, and to attempt to 
reach a group consensus through discussion. You will have 15 minutes per 
topic.   
 
One member of your group has been randomly selected to be the ‘monitor.’  
The monitor’s job is to (1) read instructions and questions aloud to the 
group, (2) make sure the group performs each discussion task in the proper 
order, (3) set the timer at 15 minutes for each discussion and (4) record the 
group’s final consensus opinion at the end of each discussion. 
 
The monitor will be given 5 numbered envelopes, which should be opened 
in numerical order. For instance, the monitor will first open Envelope 1, 
read the question and instructions inside to the group, and then set the timer 
for 15 minutes.  At the end of the 15 minutes, the monitor will record the 
‘Group Consensus Opinion’ (if there is consensus), and then open Envelope 
2. 
 
 Each discussion should last approximately 15 minutes.  DO NOT take straw 
votes until you are close to the end of your time – use the full 15 minutes. 
 
IMPORTANT NOTE: Be sure not to close discussion before everyone has 
had a chance to talk. 
 
If you understand these instructions, you can open Envelope 1 and begin 
discussion on the first topic.” 
 
                                                                                                                                             
Cheney, Wayne Allard (U.S. Senator from Colorado), Rush Limbaugh, Pat Robertson.  The liberal names included 
Edward Kennedy, Hillary Clinton, Jessie Jackson, and John Kerry. 5 
   
Participants discussed the three issues as a group and tried to reach a consensus in fifteen 
minutes of discussion.  After the discussion, they filled out another questionnaire in which they 





Each group discussed the same three issues, and every member rated their personal 
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The three issues were: 
 
1. The United States should sign an international agreement to reduce the greenhouse 
gases produced in this country that contribute to global warming. 
 
2. When different applicants for the same job or educational opportunity are almost equal 
on relevant criteria, then the job or admission should be given to members of groups in 
society that have been discriminated against in the past. 
 
3. Two adults of the same sex should be able to form a "civil union," which would entitle 
them to certain legal rights such as joint home ownership, or access to the other's 
retirement or medical benefits. 
 






   
C. Results 
 
The recruitment process was successful in assembling groups in Boulder that were, on 
average, significantly more liberal than those in Colorado Springs in their initial opinions (Table 
1).  When combined across all three issues, individual pre-discussion opinions show substantial 
differences between the two counties.
9  
 
Table 1.  Summary of Individual Responses 
 
BOULDER (liberal groups) 
 
 mean  mean  moved  stayed  moved  %  groups 
 pre-deliberationpost-deliberation down  same  up  polarized   
Global Warming  9.19  9.44  5  18   8  60% 
Affirmative Action  5.81  6.38  6  11  15  80% 
Civil Unions  9.22  9.69  1  19  12  100%   
Overall  8.07 8.50 12  48  35  80% 
 
 
COLORADO SPRINGS (conservative groups) 
 
 mean  mean  moved  stayed  moved  %  groups 
 pre-deliberation  post-deliberation down  same  up  polarized   
Global Warming  5.13  2.97  21   7   3  100% 
Affirmative  Action  2.84 1.61 19  10    2  100% 
Civil Unions  2.48  2.19  8  18   5  80%   
Overall  3.48 2.26 48  35  10  93% 
   
 
We now explore the effects of deliberation, separately analyzing the consequences for 
individual views and the consequences for group decisions. 
1.  Individual mean shifts toward extremity.  With respect to the views of individuals, the 
results showed consistent evidence of ideological amplification.  Six groups produced individual 
                                            
9 A repeated measures ANOVA showed that there were highly significant differences between the two samples in 
their pre-deliberation opinions on the issues to be discussed: F(1,61) = 234.3, p  < .001), This difference was 
separately significant for each of the three issues (each issue p < .001). 7 
   
means that shifted in the same direction as the general leaning of the group for all three issues, 
and the other four groups did so on two of the three issues.  There were a total of thirty group 
discussions (ten groups X three issues per group).  Overall, then, twenty-six of thirty discussions 
(87%) produced ideological amplification in individual judgments. (An analysis of the medians 
produced essentially identical results.)  
This pattern of amplification is confirmed in a more formal analysis.  For all individuals, 
we subtracted pre-discussion opinions from post-discussion opinions on each issue to produce an 
attitude shift “difference score.”  For the liberal groups, a positive difference would represent 
amplification and for the conservative groups it would be a negative difference; and this is 
exactly what we observe (Table 1).  This difference between counties is highly significant, 
F(1,61) = 56.1, p < .001, and is separately significant for each issue (global warming  p < .001,  
affirmative action p < .001 and civil unions p < .02).  Thus we clearly observe a shift toward 
more extreme opinions in groups of both ideologies, but in opposite directions.   
There is a small but statistically significant tendency for the conservative groups to shift 
their opinions more, after discussion, than do the liberal groups (p < .01).  However, it would be 
a mistake to pay much attention to this difference. While some groups would undoubtedly shift 
more than others, the difference found here is probably an artifact of the fact that on global 
warming and civil unions, liberal groups were so extreme at the beginning that there was little 
room for them to move after discussion (Table 1).  
2.  Differentiation:  the gap between liberals and conservatives.  Liberals and 
conservatives have different opinions and beliefs about many social and political issues, and it is 
no surprise that they might come to our study with differences on the particularly salient and 
controversial issues we chose for discussion (see Table 1 and footnote 5 above).   What is the 
effect of deliberation, by like-minded groups, on those differences? The answer is simple: 
Because of the ideological amplification resulting from the group process, the initial gulf 
between opinions in the two counties (8.07 for Boulder vs. 3.48 for Colorado Springs, a 
difference of 4.59) grew far wider (8.50 for Boulder vs. 2.26 for Colorado Springs, a now much 
larger difference of 6.24, p < .001). 
3.  Reduced internal diversity. Another important question about deliberation is whether 
participants will converge or diverge during the process.  A common method for measuring 
diversity in opinions is by their standard deviation. For our Deliberation Day, the result is clear:  8 
   
The diversity of opinion within our groups (as measured by the standard deviation of their 
ratings on an issue) was markedly lower after deliberation (Figure 1).  The standard deviation of 
individual opinions in the group was lower after deliberation for no fewer than twenty-nine of 
the thirty group-issue combinations, and fell from a median of 1.17 pre-deliberation to .69 post (z 
= 4.7, p <.001, by a sign test). In other words, deliberation greatly promoted intra-group 
homogeneity.   
If we look across groups within a county, a similar pattern can be found: the standard 
deviation among groups in Boulder declined from .67 to .51, and in Colorado Springs from .85 to 
.76.  After deliberation, the opinions of even different groups of people from the same place were 
more similar -- despite not talking with each other.  Overall, then, deliberation created more 
homogeneity of opinion within a location. 
 
Figure 1. Opinion Diversity Declines After Deliberation  
  
 
4.  Group decisions. What is the relationship between individual views, pre-deliberation, 
and the views of deliberating groups?  This question is of independent interest, because much of 9 
   
the time, what matters is what groups think and do as such, not only what their members think 
and do as individuals. The basic answer is that group decisions were more extreme than the mean 
or median of pre-deliberation judgments. 
Overall, twenty-five of thirty groups (83%) reached a consensus decision on a numerical 
scale response within fifteen minutes – ten of ten on global warming, seven of ten on affirmative 
action, and eight of ten on civil unions.  Among the twenty five group-issue combinations on 
which a consensus was reached, nineteen groups (76%) reached a consensus decision that was 
more extreme than the mean pre-deliberation individual opinion of group members (the same 
figure holds for median pre-deliberation responses). 
 
3. Explanations and Implications 
On Deliberation Day, liberals grew more liberal, and conservatives grew more 
conservative; within groups, internal diversity was diminished; and the gap between liberals and 
conservatives grew. Why did this happen? 
 
A. Conformity, Ideological Amplification, and Group Polarization 
1.  Consensus and polarization in general. When people discuss their beliefs and 
preferences in groups, consensus is almost certain to increase.  The increase in conformity occurs 
for two reasons. The first involves basic conformity or herding habits, which lead people to defer 
to the opinions of others (whether or not they actually agree with them).
10 The second involves 
the fact that people learn from the information and views of others; as a result, discussion leads 
to changes in points of view.
11 Of course mere deference, in public, to the views of others would 
not be expected to affect anonymous statements of opinion, and indeed we observe greater 
diversity in those statements that in the views of groups as such. But when a group member has 
signed onto an official view, the private statement might well be affected, simply because it is 
                                            
10 Solomon Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, in READINGS ABOUT THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 13 (Elliott Aronson ed., 
7th ed. 1995); Leon Festinger, A Theory of Social Comparison Processes 1954; 7 HUM. REL. 117, Muzafer Sherif, 
An Experimental Approach to the Study of Attitudes, 1 SOCIOMETRY 90 (1937). A good outline can be found in LEE 
ROSS & RICHARD NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION 28-30 (1991). 
11 Daniel Gigone & Reid Hastie, Proper Analysis of the Accuracy of Group Judgment, 121 PSYCHOL. BULL. 149, 
161-62 (1997); Reid Hastie, Review Essay:  Experimental Evidence of Group Accuracy, in INFORMATION POOLING 
AND GROUP DECISION MAKING 129, 133–46 (Bernard Grofman & Guillermo Owen eds., 1986). 10 
   
jarring to maintain a view in private that diverges from what one has said in public.
12 In any 
event group members who learn from one another are likely to be affected in their anonymous 
statements as well as their public ones, and hence we observe a significant increase in internal 
consensus as a result of deliberation. That phenomenon is familiar in groups of many different 
sorts, including political parties, religious organizations, university faculties, labor unions, and 
corporate boards.  
More strikingly, a well-known effect of discussion is group polarization, by which 
deliberating groups end up in a more extreme position in line with their pre-deliberation 
tendencies.
13  On Deliberation Day, group polarization occurred in the particular form of 
ideological amplification. Indeed, we find unmistakable evidence of that phenomenon in the 
political domain. 
This is a noteworthy finding, because few studies of group polarization involve politics at 
all.  The original experiments involved risk-taking behavior, with a demonstration that risk-
inclined people became still more risk-inclined as a result of deliberation.
14 With respect to 
business-related decisions, groups seemed to be willing to take risks that their individual 
members would avoid.
15 Later studies showed that under some conditions the “risky shift” could 
be a “cautious shift,” as risk-averse people become more averse to certain risks after they talk 
with one another.
16  It was readily apparent that the direction of the shift – toward greater risk-
taking or greater caution -- was related to the domain of experience in which the risky choice 
was embedded.  The principal examples of “cautious shifts” involved the decision whether to 
marry and the decision whether to board a plane despite severe abdominal pain, possibly 
requiring medical attention.
17  In these cases, deliberating groups moved toward caution, as did 
the members who composed them.  
                                            
12 On the general phenomenon, see Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies (1997). 
13 See ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE SECOND EDITION (1985); Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Group 
Polarization, 10 J. POL. PHIL. 175 (2002). 
14 See Stoner, J. A. F., A Comparison of Individual and Group Decision Involving Risk (1961)  (unpublished 
Master's thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology). 
15 Id. 
16 Serge Moscovici & Marisa Zavalloni, The Group as a Polarizer of Attitudes, J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
12, 125-135 (1969). 
17 See id. 11 
   
More careful analysis demonstrated that the best predictor of the direction of the shift 
turned out to be the pre-deliberation median.
18 Where group members were disposed toward risk, 
a risky shift was observed. Where members were disposed toward caution, a cautious shift was 
observed. Hence group polarization refers to the tendency of deliberating groups to shift in a 
more extreme position in line with their pre-deliberation tendency. Ideological amplification, as 
we use the term here, is best understood as a special case of group polarization. 
In the behavioral laboratory, group polarization has been found for a remarkably wide 
range of questions. Group deliberation produces more pronounced views on the attractiveness of 
people shown in slides; it also occurs for obscure factual questions, such as how far Sodom (on 
the Dead Sea) is below sea level.19  Even burglars show a shift, in the cautious direction, when 
they discuss prospective criminal endeavors.
20   
In the domain of law, there is considerable evidence of group polarization as well. Group 
polarization occurs for judgments of guilt and sentencing in criminal cases.
21  In punitive 
damages cases, deliberating juries have been found to polarize, producing awards that are often 
higher than those of the median juror before deliberation begins.
22 With respect to legal 
questions, panels of appellate judges polarize too; both Republican and Democratic appointees 
show stronger ideological tendencies when sitting on panels consisting entirely of judges 
appointed by presidents of the same political party.
23 There is also evidence of group polarization 
in issues that bear directly on politics. As a result of deliberation, French people become more 
distrustful of the United States and its intentions with respect to foreign aid.
24  So too, feminism 
can become more attractive to women after internal discussions.25  White people who are not 
                                            
18 Id. 
19 Id.   
20   Paul Cromwell et al., Group Effects on Decision-Making by Burglars, 69 PSYCHOL. REP. 579, 586 (1991). 
21 Martin F. Kaplan, Group-Induced Polarization in Simulated Juries, 2 PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 63 
(1976); Martin F. Kaplan, Discussion Polarization Effects in a Modified Jury Decision Paradigm: Informational 
Influences, 40 SOCIOMETRY 262 (1977). 
22 See David Schkade et al., Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM L. REV. 1139 (2000). 
23 See CASS  R.  SUNSTEIN,  DAVID  SCHKADE,  LISA  ELLMAN,  &  ANDRES  SAWICKI,  ARE  JUDGES  POLITICAL?  AN 
EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006); Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, & Lisa Ellman, 
Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301 (2004). 
24 BROWN, supra note, at 224.    
25 Norbert L. Kerr et al., Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals and Groups, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 687, 689, 691–
93 (1996). 12 
   
inclined to show racial prejudice show less prejudice after deliberation than before; but white 
people who are inclined to show such prejudice show more prejudice after deliberation.
26  
 2.  Sorting vs. mixing. On our Deliberation Day, people were sorted into like-minded 
groups, and geography greatly simplified this sorting. Such sorting was a central part of our 
design, because we were interested in the effects of deliberations within and across like-minded 
groups. As we have suggested, actual sorting appears to be increasing in geographical terms, as 
communities within the United States are becoming more uniform in their political 
commitments.
27 In addition, virtual sorting, across political lines, is far easier with the rise of 
more specialized communications options, and there is evidence that such sorting is also 
occurring.
28 
But it is natural to ask what would have happened if there had been a degree of mixing – 
if people from Colorado Springs had participated in groups with people from Boulder. Mixing 
might have occurred, as it often does occur, voluntarily. Alternatively, mixing might have been 
engineered by the experimental design. In terms of ultimate outcomes, existing work suggests 
two possibilities. First, and most likely, the pre-deliberation median would have been predictive 
here as well, in the sense that it would predict both the group’s decision and the shift in 
individual views.
29 Suppose, for example, that a group of five people tended to oppose civil 
unions for same-sex couples, because four members sharply opposed them and two members 
were mildly in favor of them. In that event, the group would probably move in the direction of 
greater opposition, notwithstanding a degree of internal heterogeneity. What matters is the pre-
deliberation median, not the existence or extent of such heterogeneity.
30 Note in this regard that 
many of our groups began with some antecedent heterogeneity, and they nonetheless moved in 
the way predicted by previous group polarization research. As we shall shortly see, this 
conclusion follows from an understanding of the sources of polarization.   
The second possibility is that positions will be entrenched, with group members showing 
a reluctance to listen to those with identifiably competing positions. Polarization may not be 
                                            
26 See id.  
27 See note supra. 
28 See note supra. 
29 See BROWN, supra note. 
30 See Schkade et al., supra note (finding that the pre-deliberation median predicts movements, even when there is 
considerable internal diversity). 13 
   
found when the relevant group consists of individuals drawn equally from two extremes,
31 and 
“familiar and long-debated issues do not depolarize easily.”
32 We have said that ideological 
amplification generally occurs on the federal judiciary. But on two issues -- capital punishment 
and abortion -- Republican appointees are not affected by sitting with two Democratic 
appointees, and Democratic appointees are impervious to the influences of two Republican 
appointees.
33 Within deliberating groups, entrenchment is more likely if group membership is 
specifically announced or otherwise made salient. For most political issues, on which people do 
not have rigidly determined positions, social influences and hence polarization are more typical. 
Mixed groups have, however, been shown to have two desirable effects. First, exposure 
to competing positions generally increases political tolerance.
34 After hearing a variety of views, 
including those that diverge from their own, many people are more respectful of alternative 
positions and more willing to consider them to be plausible or legitimate. An important result of 
seeing a political conflict as legitimate is a “greater willingness to extend civil liberties to even 
those groups whose political views one dislikes a great deal.”
35 Second, mixing increases the 
likelihood that people will be aware of competing rationales and see that their own arguments 
might be met by counterarguments.
36 This effect is far more pronounced, however, for those who 
antecedently show a “civil orientation toward conflict,” in the sense that they are committed to a 
degree of social harmony and are willing to acknowledge, in advance, that dissenting views 
should be expressed.
37  These desirable effects of deliberation within mixed groups will not be 
realized on any Deliberation Day in which people are sorted, or sort themselves, into politically 
homogeneous groups. 
 
B. Explaining Polarization 
Why does group polarization occur?  There are several reasons.38 The first and perhaps 
most important stems from the fact that group members offer information.  In Colorado, as 
                                            
31 See H. Burnstein, Persuasion As Argument Processing, in GROUP DECISION MAKING (H. Brandstetter, J.H. Davis, 
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33 See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note. 
34 See Mutz, supra note, at 76-77. 
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36 Id. at 74-76. 
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elsewhere, group members show a willingness to consider both the conclusions and the 
arguments that are offered in the course of deliberation. With respect to same-sex marriage, for 
example, skeptics made slippery slope arguments, worrying about the risk that if marriage is not 
limited to one man and one woman, further changes in the institution will be difficult to prevent. 
For purposes of understanding shifts in views, the key point is that in any group with some initial 
inclination, the views of most people in the group will inevitably be skewed in the direction of 
that inclination.  Suppose, for example, that most people in a group believe that an international 
treaty to control global warming is a bad idea. As a statistical matter, the arguments favoring that 
initial position will be more numerous than the arguments pointing in the other direction.   
Individuals will have heard of some, but not all, of the arguments that emerge from group 
deliberation; perhaps they will not have heard concerns about the expense of international 
controls, the dangers of ceding controls over energy policy, the possibility that global warming 
will have only modest negative effects for the United States.  As a result of hearing the various 
arguments, deliberation will lead people toward a more extreme point in line with what group 
members initially believed. Through this process, many minds can polarize, and in exactly the 
same direction. Informational influences had an evident influence on Deliberation Day in 
Colorado. 
The second explanation stresses the close links between confidence, extremism, and 
corroboration by others.39 If people lack confidence, they will tend toward the middle, and hence 
avoid the extremes. As people gain confidence, they usually are willing to become more extreme 
in their beliefs. Agreement from others tends to increase confidence, and in this way like-minded 
people, having deliberated with one another, become more sure that they are right and thus more 
extreme. In a wide variety of experimental contexts, people’s opinions have been shown to 
become more extreme simply because their views have been corroborated, and because they 
have become more confident after learning that others share their views.40 A process of this kind 
undoubtedly occurred in Colorado. Within both liberal and conservative groups, some people 
began with a degree of tentativeness, in a way that moved them toward the middle of the relevant 
scale. After hearing both conclusions and arguments that fortified their original inclinations, they 
moved, with remarkable regularity, to a more extreme position. 
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The third explanation involves social influences.
41 Sometimes people’s publicly stated 
views are, to a greater or lesser extent, a function of how they want to present themselves. People 
usually want to be perceived favorably by other group members.  Once they hear what others 
believe, some will adjust their positions at least slightly in the direction of the dominant position, 
to present themselves in the way that they prefer. In a liberal  group, for example, movements in 
the liberal direction will be favored and, for this reason, all members might end up leaning 
somewhat more to the left. This explanation fits well with the changes that we observed. 
A great deal of work suggests that group polarization is heightened when people have a 
sense of shared identity, and this point helps to suggest yet another explanation of polarization.42  
People may polarize because they are attempting to conform to the position that they see as 
typical within their own group. If their group’s particular identity is especially salient or 
important, the in-group norms “are likely to become more extreme so as to be more clearly 
differentiated from outgroup norms, and the within-group polarization will be enhanced.”43  
When Democrats or Republicans become polarized, the desire to ensure intergroup 
differentiation is likely to be a motive. In our own experiment, involving global warming, 
affirmative action, and civil unions, many groups were all the more prone to polarization when 
their internal discussions referred to some group with whom they disagreed, such as “the 
liberals.” 
 
C. The Limits of Polarization 
We have traced four social-cognitive processes that feed into the the polarization effect:  
informational pressure, conformity effects, social influences, and group membership. An 
understanding of these processes suggest that ideological amplification is highly likely to occur 
on Deliberation Day. It also suggests the circumstances in which ideological amplification might 
be dampened or prevented. In particular, interventions that involve external administrators, or 
independent flows of information, might produce different kinds of shifts. 
In highly influential work, for example, James Fishkin has pioneered the idea of a 
“deliberative opinion poll,” in which small groups, consisting of highly diverse individuals, are 
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asked to come together and to deliberate about various issues.
44 Fishkin has conducted 
deliberative opinion polls on numerous questions and in several nations, including the United 
States, England, and Australia. Fishkin finds some noteworthy shifts in individual views, in a 
way that suggests that deliberation is having a significant effect; but he does not find a 
systematic tendency toward ideological amplification. In his studies, individuals shift both 
toward and away from the median of pre-deliberation views. In England, for example, 
deliberation led to reduced interest in using imprisonment as a tool for combating crime.
45 The 
percentage believing that “sending more offenders to prison” is an effective way to prevent crime 
went down from 57% to 38%; the percentage believing that fewer people should be sent to 
prison increased from 29% to 44%; belief in the effectiveness of “stiffer sentences” was reduced 
from 78% to 65%.
46 Similar shifts were shown in the direction of greater enthusiasm for 
procedural rights of defendants and increased willingness to explore alternatives to prison. In 
other experiments with the deliberative opinion poll, shifts included a mixture of findings, with 
larger percentages of individuals concluding that legal pressures should be increased on fathers 
for child support (from 70% to 85%) and that welfare and health care should be turned over to 
the states (from 56% to 66%).
47  
On some issues, the effect of deliberation was to create an increase in the intensity with 
which people held their pre-existing convictions.
48 These findings, a form of ideological 
amplification, are consistent with the prediction of group polarization. But in deliberative 
opinion polls, this was hardly a uniform pattern. On some questions, deliberation increased the 
percentage of people holding a minority position (with, for example, a jump from 36% to 57% of 
people favoring policies making divorce “harder to get”).
49 These changes are very different 
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from what we observed in Colorado, and they are not what would be predicted by group 
polarization.  
At least three factors distinguish the deliberative opinion poll from our Deliberation Day. 
First, Fishkin’s groups were overseen by a moderator, concerned to ensure a level of openness 
and likely to alter some of the dynamics discussed here. Second, and probably more important, 
Fishkin’s studies presented participants with a set of written materials that attempted to be 
balanced and that contained detailed arguments supporting sides. The likely consequence would 
be to move people in different directions from those that would be expected by simple group 
discussion, unaffected by external materials inevitably containing a degree of authority. Indeed, 
it would be easy to produce a set of such materials that would predictably shift people’s views in 
the direction favored by the experimenter. And even without a self-conscious attempt at 
manipulation, or a general effort to be neutral and fair, the materials will undoubtedly affect the 
direction that deliberation will take group members. Third, Fishkin’s participants did not 
deliberate to a group decision, and the absence of such a decision probably attenuated the 
influences discussed here. We have suggested that when individuals commit themselves to a 
group judgment, it is likely that their individual responses, even if subsequent and anonymous, 
will be affected by the commitment. To indicate a private judgment that diverges from one’s own 
public judgment is certainly possible, but it produces a degree of dissonance. To be sure, group 
polarization has been found after mere exposure to the views of other group members, but it is 
typically smaller than after discussion and group judgment.
50  
These three factors undoubtedly contribute to Fishkin’s results. It is difficult to know, in 
advance and in the abstract, how any particular group will respond to any particular set of 
materials, even one that attempts to be balanced; everything depends on the nature of the group 
and the nature (and labeling) of the materials. And it would be valuable to attempt to conduct 
deliberative opinion polls with testable hypotheses – suggesting, for example, that deliberating 
groups might reach the right answer on questions that have answers that can be shown to be 
right. Our only suggestion here is that on political issues, the likely result for deliberating groups, 
unaccompanied by an external moderator or a set of independent arguments, is amplification of 
preexisting views, especially if group members are asked to reach a collective decision. 
 
                                            
50 See Brown, supra note.  18 
   
D. Implications 
Does ideological amplification lead to accurate or inaccurate answers?  Do deliberating 
groups err when they polarize?  No general answer would make sense.  A great deal will turn on 
the relationship between the correct answer and the group’s pre-deliberation tendencies. If the 
group is leaning toward the right answer, polarization might lead them directly to the truth. But 
there are no guarantees here. When individuals are leaning in a direction that is mistaken, the 
mistake will be amplified by group deliberation.  
Consider some results from domains in which mistakes and biases can be identified 
without taking a controversial stand on normative issues. With respect to questions with correct 
answers, deliberating groups tend to do about as well as or slightly better than their average 
member -- but not as well as their best members, and they do not reliably answer correctly.51 
Group polarization occurs when jury members are biased as a result of pretrial publicity; the jury 
as a group becomes more biased than individual jurors were.52  This is polarization in action, 
and it produces large blunders. When most people are prone to make conjunction errors 
(believing that A and B are more likely together than A or B alone), group processes lead to 
more errors, not fewer.53 Hence it is possible to show that in many domains, the consequence of 
deliberation is to perpetuate and even to amplify individual mistakes.
54 When individuals show a 
high degree of bias, groups are likely to be more biased, not less biased, than their median or 
average member.
55 
  More generally, a comprehensive study demonstrated that majority pressures can be 
powerful even for factual questions on which some people know the right answer.56  The study 
involved 1200 people, forming groups of six, five, and four members. Individuals were asked 
true-false questions, involving art, poetry, public opinion, geography, economics, and politics. 
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They were then asked to assemble into groups, which discussed the questions and produced 
answers by consensus.  The clearest result was that the views of the majority played a big role in 
determining the group’s answers. When a majority of individuals in the group gave the right 
answer, the group’s decision followed the majority in no less than 79% of the cases. The truth 
played a role too, but a lesser one.  If a majority of individuals in the group gave the wrong 
answer, the group decision nonetheless moved toward the majority position in 56% of the cases. 
Hence the truth did have an influence—79% is higher than 56%—and this is a definite point in 
favor of deliberation. But the majority’s judgment, and not the truth, was the dominant influence.  
And because the majority was influential even when wrong, the average group decision was right 
only slightly more often than the average individual decision (66% vs. 62%). 
We do not contend that every Deliberation Day will have the same results as Deliberation 
Day in Colorado.  But in any nation that shows political segregation along geographic lines, 
similar outcomes should be expected. It is plausible to suggest that some nations, including the 
United States, operate to some extent as a collection of special interest enclaves
57 in which 
people are especially likely to associate and deliberate with others who agree with them.  To the 
extent that migration patterns are now producing more homogeneous subcultures,
58 routine 
exposure to diverse opinions may become less likely. Similar results might be produced by the 
rise of highly specialized sources of information, above all the Internet, which makes it 
increasingly easy for people to avoid opinions that differ from theirs.
59  Indeed, there is a well-
documented tendency for people to seek information that confirms their existing beliefs and to 
avoid or devalue disconfirming information (“confirmation bias”).
60  The ease of finding 
confirmatory evidence is likely to accelerate the balkanization of opinion.  
As Fishkin’s studies suggest, it should be possible to structure deliberation in such a way 
as to diminish the likelihood of polarization; neutral arbiters, providing information and helping 
to manage discussion, might have a substantial effect. Various efforts to “prime” participants 
might influence the effects of deliberation. If participants are reminded of the attacks on 9/11, or 
of events that cast a favorable or unfavorable light on certain positions or even officials, they are 
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likely to be affected, perhaps in a way that will diminish the effects found here.  But whatever 
the effects of such priming, Deliberation Day in Colorado offers important cautionary notes 
about the consequences of deliberation on political judgments.    
 
4. Conclusion 
On Deliberation Day, liberals became more liberal and conservatives became more 
conservative. On some of the largest issues of the day, discussions by like-minded people fueled 
greater extremism, and also increased divisions between liberals and conservatives. At the same 
time, both liberal and conservative groups became more homogeneous; deliberation reduced 
internal diversity. There is every reason to believe that results of this kind occur not simply in 
experimental settings, but in many domains in which citizens engage in political discussions with 
one another – especially to the extent that they sort themseves into actual or virtual groups of the 
like-minded. Those who seek to foster broader deliberation, or to celebrate deliberative 
conceptions of democracy, might do well to keep these points in view. 
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